UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-19-2014

Nampa Educ. Ass'n v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41454

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Nampa Educ. Ass'n v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131 Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41454" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs.
5001.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5001

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

)
) Supreme Court Docket No. 41454-2013
Petitioner-Respondent,
)
) Canyon County Docket No. 2013-2962-C
VS.
)
)
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
)
)
Respondent-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Canyon
THE HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY PRESIDING

William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden A venue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, ID 83653
Telephone:
208-466-9222
Facsimile:
208-466-1981
Email:
bud(cJ),wyostlaw.com
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant

Paul J. Stark, ISB No. 5919
Idaho Education Association
620 North Sixth Street
PO Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone:
208-344-1341
Facsimile:
208-344-1606
Email:
pstark@idahoea.org
Attorneys for Petitioner-Respondent

FILED· COPY
FEB 19 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................ 1
A.

Nature of the Case ............................................................................................ 1

B.

Course of Proceedings ...................................................................................... 1

C.

Statement of the Facts ....................................................................................... 3

IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................................... 5
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ......................................................................................... 5
IV. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 6
A.

Standard of Review ......................................................................................... 6

B.

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 7

C.

NEA Did Not Have Standing to Bring its Petition for Declaratory
Judgment. ......................................................................................................... 9

D.

The Completely Performed Addendums Rendered the Issue
Presented by NEA to be Moot. ...................................................................... 11

E.

The Addendums Were Not in Violation ofldaho Code§ 33-513
or§§ 33-1272 and 33-1273 ........................................................................... 14
1.

Application ofldaho Code§ 33-513 ................................................. 14

2.

Application ofldaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq .................................... 18

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 21

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases
Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944, 231 P .3d 1041 (2010) .................................... 7
Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n v. Bd of Trustees of Bear Lake School Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776
P.2d 452 (1989) ......................................................................................................................... 15
Black v. Idaho State Police, No. 39822, slip op. (Idaho, November 27, 2013),
www.isc.idaho.gov/appeals-court/sccivil .......................................................................... 6, 7, 19
Callies, et al. v. O'Neal, et al., 147 Idaho 841,216 P.3d 130 (2009) ............................................ 16
Carrier, et al. v. Lake Pend Oreille School District #84, et al., 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655
(2006) .................................................................................................................................. 16, 17
Chavez v. Barrus, et al., 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008) ......................................................... 7
Ciszek, et al. v. Kootenai County Bd of Com 'rs, et al., 151 Idaho 123,254 P.3d 24 (2011) .......... 9
Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, et al., No. 40101, slip op. (Idaho, January 24,
2014 ), www. isc. idaho.govlappeals-courtlsccivil ..................................................................... 6, 7
Fields v. State, 149 Idaho 399,234 P.3d 723 (2010) ...................................................................... 7
Freeman v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 71 P.3d 471 (Idaho App. 2003) ............. 12
Gillihan v. Gump, et al., 140 Idaho 264, 92 P.3d 514 (2004) ....................................................... 16
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956 (1969) .......................................................... 12, 13
Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity, et al. v. Idaho State Bd of Education, et al., 128
Idaho276, 912P.2d644(1996) ............................................................................................... 12
In Re Jerome County Bd of Comm 'rs v. Jerome County, et al., 153 Idaho 298,281 P.3d 1076
(2012) ........................................................................................................................................ 10
KeybankNational Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, No. 38645, slip op. (Idaho, filed October 3, 2013),
www.isc.idaho.gov/appeals-court/sccivil .................................................................................. 16
Martin, et al. v. Camas County ex rel. Bd Com 'rs, 150 Idaho 508,248 P.3d 1243 (2011) ...... 9, 10
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181 (1982) ................................................................. 13

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - ii

New Phase Investments, LLC v. Jarvis, et al., 153 Idaho 207,280 P.3d 710 (2012) .................... 16
Parkwest Homes, LLCv. Barnson, etal., 154 Idaho 678,302 P.3d 18 (2013) ............................. 16
Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd OfComm'rs of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551,976 P.2d
477 (1999) ................................................................................................................................. 17
Roesch, etal. v. Klemann, etal., 155 Idaho 175,307 P.3d 192 (2013) ........................................ 17
Schneider v. Howe, et al., 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006) ............................................. 9, 10
Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 204 P.3d 1114 (2009) ............................................................... 7
Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., et al., 141 Idaho 754, 118 P.3d 86
(2005) ........................................................................................................................................ 11
Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249, 61 P.3d 606 (2002) .................................................. 6
Wylie v. State, et al., 151 Idaho 26,253 P.3d 700 (2011) ............................................................. 12
Young, et al. v. City of Ketchum, et al., 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002) ................................ 9
Statutes
Idaho Code §12-117 ..................................................................................................................... 5, 6
Idaho Code §12-121 ..................................................................................................................... 5, 6
Idaho Code §33-513 .................................................................. 1, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21
Idaho Code §33-701 ........................................................................................................................ 8
Idaho Code §33-801 ........................................................................................................................ 8
Idaho Code §33-1271 ............................................................................................ 5, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19
Idaho Code §33-1272 ............................................................................................... 1, 14, 18, 19, 20
Idaho Code §33-1273 ..................................................................................................... 1, 14, 18, 20
Idaho Code §33-1275 ...................................................................................................................... 3
Idaho Code §33-1276 ............................................................................................................ 5, 8, 20

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - iii

Other Authorities
Walters, Jr., Hon. Jesse R., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, at 8, 38 Idaho L.Rev. 1
(2001) ........................................................................................................................................... 6

Rules
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) ............................................................................................................................... 6
I.R.C.P. 56(c) ................................................................................................................................... 6

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - iv

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

In the Fall of 2012, Appellant, Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District"), found
itself in a financial crisis with a $5.1 million deficit in its 2012-2013 budget.
To provide greater cash flow during the second semester of the 2012-2013 school year,
teachers signed Addendums to Continuing Teacher Contracts and Addendums to Category A
Teacher Contracts ("Addendums"), which allowed teachers to voluntarily contribute unpaid
furlough days.
Nampa Education Association ("NEA") framed only one issue to be decided by the district
court. It wanted the Addendums to be declared unlawful. (R., p. 7.) The trial court agreed and found
that the Addendums were illegal and unlawful and issued its summary judgment. (R., p. 114.)
School District is appealing that decision.
IfNEA is successful on its anticipated argument in support of standing, this Court will then
decide the applicability of Idaho Code §33-513 and §§33-1272 and 33-1273 to the facts of this case.
This decision will provide needed guidance to local education associations and boards of trustees in
their continued educational relationships.

B.

Course of Proceedings
1.

On March 25, 2013, Respondent, NEA, filed its Petition for Declaratory Judgment

asking the district court for an order declaring the Addendums to be unlawful and unenforceable.
(R., pp. 4-8.)
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2.

School District filed its Answer to Petition for Declaratory Judgment on April 18,

2013, denying that the Addendums were unlawful and asserting several affirmative defenses. (R.,
pp. 9-13.)
3.

School District filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on June 5, 2013 (R., pp. 14-

15) with its supporting Memorandum (R., pp. 16-35), together with the Affidavit of Steve Kipp
("Kipp Affidavit") (R., pp. 36-38).
4.

NEA filed its cross Motion for Summary Judgment on July 5, 2013 (R., pp. 39-41),

together with its Memorandum (R., pp. 42-49) and the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson, President of
NEA ("Simpson Affidavit") (R., pp. 50-64).
5.

School District filed its Reply to NEA's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 12,

2013. (R., pp. 65-71.)
6.

NEA filed its Memorandum in Opposition to School District's Motion for Summary

Judgment on July 17, 2013. (R., pp. 72-81.)
7.

School District filed its Reply to NEA's Memorandum in Opposition on July 25,

2013. (R., pp. 82-89.)
8.

NEA filed its Reply Memorandum on July 25, 2013. (R., pp. 90-99.)

9.

Oral argument was heard by Judge Huskey on August 1, 2013.

10.

The district court entered its Order on Summary Judgment on August 16, 2013. (R.,

pp. 100-117.) Judge Huskey struck all hearsay from the Simpson Affidavit; and as a result, there
was no evidence before the court of individual members ofNEA suffering harm. Significantly, the
Simpson Affidavit alleged no harm to NEA as an association. (R., pp. 50-52.) However, the district
court determined that NEA had standing as an association and issued the declaratory judgment.
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11.

School District timely filed its Notice of Appeal on September 27, 2013. (R., pp.

118-123.)
12.

Order Remanding to district court filed on October 9, 2013. (R., p. 124.)

13.

The district court entered its Order of Final Judgment on October 17, 2013. (R., pp.

125-126.)
14.

School District timely filed its Amended Notice of Appeal on November 1, 2013.

(R., pp. 127-132.)

C.

Statement of the Facts
NEA was the selected bargaining group for the teachers of School District for the 2012-

2013 school year to negotiate a master contract or negotiations agreement. Master contracts and
negotiations agreements are synonymous, and will be referred to as "Master Agreement." The
Master Agreement for 2011-2012 between School District and NEA terminated June 30, 2012,
as provided by Idaho Code § 33-1275. Months of negotiations by NEA and School District
produced no Master Agreement that would govern negotiations for the 2012-2013 school year.
As required by law, School District issued standard teachers' contracts containing the last best
offer made by School District. This offer was accepted by individual teachers, and contracts were
executed. (R., p. 108.)
School District discovered a $5.1 million deficit in the 2012-2013 budget. The district
court agreed and recognized significant budget shortfalls for School District. (R., p. 101.) To
reduce this deficit, the voters of School District passed a supplemental levy in 2013.
Additionally, School District obtained judicial approval to allow borrowing to bridge the funding
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gap when waiting for the receipt of state funds. School District also imposed furlough days for
classified employees and administrators, altered school bus routes, and closed an elementary
school.
It became apparent that School District would face extreme cash-flow deficiencies in the

Spring of 2013. The impact of having reduced cash would interfere with School District's ability
to provide education for the children, and the specter of bankruptcy loomed.
As one would expect of professional educators, the teachers wanted to be part of the
solution and rose to the occasion by volunteering furlough days. School District prepared
Addendums to allow teachers to volunteer 1 to 4 unpaid furlough days. The Addendums ensured
volunteering teachers that there would be no reduction in benefits for a teacher who volunteered
furlough days. (R., p. 34.)
Many teachers, but not all, volunteered 1 to 4 furlough days and executed the Addendums
during the month of December, 2012. (R., p. 37.) From a staff of 849 certificated teachers, 501
teachers (approximately 59%) volunteered furlough days. It is unknown if any or all of the 501
volunteers were NEA members. After signing the Addendums, several teachers asked to either
increase or decrease their contributed furlough days, and 24 teachers did so. (R., pp. 36-37.)
NEA objected to the Addendums and informed School District by letters dated December
14, 2012 (R., pp. 60-62) and December 18, 2012 (R., pp. 63-64). School District felt no
obligation to comply with NEA demands.
The steps to cut costs taken by School District and the contributed furlough days gave
School District necessary cash flow to complete the second semester of the 2012-2013 school
year.
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The Addendums were fully performed prior to the oral argument presented to the district
court on August 1, 2013.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

NEA did not have standing to bring its Petition for Declaratory Judgment

because:
(a)

NEA was not injured by teachers volunteering furlough days to benefit

School District; and
(b)

The issue of the alleged unlawfulness of the Addendums was moot since

the Addendums had been fully performed.
There was no justiciable issue before the district court.
2.

The district court misinterpreted and improperly applied Idaho Code §33-513 and

§§ 33-1271 through 33-1276 to the facts of this case because:
(a)

The Addendums were not employment contracts and did not need to be on

a form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction;
(b)

The Addendums were not subject to statutory negotiation requirements.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The district court awarded no attorney fees or costs.
The Supreme Court can award attorney fees and costs on an appeal as provided by Idaho
Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121. To award fees and costs under Idaho Code§ 12-117, the Court must
find that either the appeal or defense was without any reasonable basis in law. Under Idaho Code
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§ 12-121, the court must find that either the appeal or defense was "brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1 ).
School District does not believe that the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121
and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) have been met by either party. NEA brought its Petition for Declaratory
Judgment in good faith, not frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Likewise, School
District believes its appeal meets the same standard. Walters, Jr., Hon. Jesse R., A Primer for
Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, at 8, 38 Idaho L.Rev. 1 (2001).

No attorney fees or costs should be awarded to either party.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of a district court's ruling on a petition for summary judgment is the
same as that required of the district court when making its rule. Farmers National Bank v. Green
River Dairy, et al., No. 40101, slip op. (Idaho, January 24, 2014), www.isc.idaho.gov/appealscourt/sccivil. Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.
56(c). The Supreme Court liberally construes "the record in favor of the party opposing the
motion and draw[s] ... all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Black v.
Idaho

State

Police,

No.

39822,

slip

op.

at

4

(Idaho,

November

27,

2013),

www.isc.idaho.gov/appeals-court/sccivil, citing Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,

251, 61 P.3d 606,608 (2002).
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Statutory interpretation and its application to the facts is a question of law. Farmers,
supra. On questions of law, the Supreme Court has "free review." Black, supra, at 4, citing
Fields v. State, 149 Idaho 399,400,234 P.3d 723, 724 (2010). The Supreme Court "is not bound

by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions from the facts
presented." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 907, 204 P.3d 1114, 1118 (2009). The Supreme
Court "exercises free review over the trial court's conclusions of law to determine if the trial
court correctly stated the principles of law and if the legal conclusions are supported by the facts
as found." Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944,947,231 P.3d 1041, 1044 (2010).
To determine if the inferences drawn by the district court were reasonably supported in the
Record, this Court will necessarily review that Record. Chavez v. Barrus, et al., 146 Idaho 212, 218,
192 P.3d 1036, 1042 (2008).
School District must convince this Court that the district court committed reversible
error. School District will argue that NEA had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court. School District will also argue that the district court misinterpreted and misapplied
the law and drew conclusions not supported by the Record in reaching its decision to grant
summary judgment.

B.

Introduction

School District asks this Court to reverse the district court decision and order summary
judgment for School District. This request is based on two legal propositions. First, there was no
justiciable issue; and, therefore, NEA did not have standing to ask the Court for a declaratory
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judgment. Second, School District had the statutory responsibility to deal with its financial
issues. Idaho Code§§ 33-701, 33-801, and 33-1276.
NEA neither alleged nor provided evidence of injury or harm to it as an association. The
Addendums had been completed, the furlough days taken, and the question of the legality of the
Addendums was moot. There was no justiciable controversy before the district court.
No Master Agreement was in effect governing negotiations between School District and
NEA; and, therefore, School District was not required to negotiate the use of the Addendums
withNEA.
The district court found, however, that individual teachers could not volunteer furlough
days when those days were negotiated outside of the statutory procedure. (R., p. 116.) The act by
individual teachers of volunteering furlough days did not constitute negotiations; therefore, Idaho
Code§ 33-1271, et seq., would not apply.
The Addendums were not employment contracts subject to the requirements of Idaho
Code § 33-513.
Once the district court found the Addendums to be illegal, the district court was then able
to make a quantum leap to find that NEA could prevent future addendums which would have a
direct or collateral effect on NEA and, thus, the issue of illegality of the Addendums was not
moot. (R., p. 110.) The district court went well beyond the Petition filed by NEA, its Affidavit,
and any evidence presented to find future harm with collateral effect on NEA. The Record does
not support this conclusion.
The errors made by the district court can be summarized as:
1.

The district court was wrong in finding a justiciable controversy; and
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2.

The district court failed to correctly interpret and apply Idaho Code §§ 33-

513 and 33-1271, et seq.

C.

NEA Did Not Have Standing to Bring its Petition for Declaratory Judgment.
NEA must demonstrate that it had standing as an association to ask for a declaratory

judgment. There must be an actual or justiciable controversy. Schneider v. Howe, et al., 142
Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006); Ciszek, et al. v. Kootenai County Bd of Com'rs, et al., 151
Idaho 123,254 P.3d 24 (2011).
NEA must allege or demonstrate that it has suffered an injury and that the relief requested
would substantially prevent or redress the claimed injury. To demonstrate an injury, NEA must
show "a distinct, palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury" and the conduct of School District in accepting the Addendums. Martin, et al. v. Camas

County ex rel. Bd Com 'rs, 150 Idaho 508,513,248 P.3d 1243, 1248 (2011).
The doctrine of standing "is imprecise and difficult to apply." Young, et al. v. City of

Ketchum, et al., 13 7 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P .3d 1157, 1159 (2002). NEA was not the object of the
action taken by School District in accepting voluntary furlough days, thus making standing for
NEA "substantially more difficult to establish." Id., at 105.
A review of NEA's Petition and Affidavit discloses no allegation of any distinct and
palpable injury or harm to NEA. There is nothing in the Record to support the district court's
inference and conclusion that the requested relief of a declaration of illegality would prevent or
redress any alleged harm that could be suffered by NEA in the future.
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The Petition requests only a declaration that the Addendums were unlawful and,
therefore, illegal. The Court, having struck all hearsay evidence from the Simpson Affidavit, left
no proof of School District bringing pressure on teachers, requiring mandatory meetings,
retaliating, or using high-pressure tactics. The district court correctly found no harm to individual
teachers. (R., p. 108.) Individual teachers would not have had standing to bring a petition for
declaratory judgment. In Re Jerome County Bd of Comm 'rs v. Jerome County, et al., 153 Idaho
298,281 P.3d 1076 (2012).
NEA did not focus on itself and allege harm to the association. It asked only for the court
to determine an issue NEA wanted to have adjudicated -- the illegality of the Addendums.

Martin, supra.
NEA has not met its burden of "showing that it had standing [as an association] to bring
the action in the first instance." Schneider, supra, at 772. It has failed to demonstrate evidence of
injury to itself or what relief it wanted, other than a declaration of illegality. NEA has not shown
an actual or justiciable controversy.
From thin air, the district court determined that NEA was harmed by the volunteered
furlough days. (R., p. 108.) Further, from the same thin air, the district court found that declaring
the Addendums illegal would be sufficient to redress the harm. (R., p. 108.) The district court
determined that furlough days affected compensation and, therefore, would be injurious to NEA
if not properly negotiated. The district court determined that the relief that it could grant
(declaratory judgment) would redress NEA's injury. There is nothing in the Record that supports
the district court's decision that there was any injury to NEA nor that the declaratory judgment
would redress any ofNEA's alleged injury.
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What injury would be suffered by NEA if some of its members volunteered furlough days
for the benefit of School District? The district court failed to explain how a finding that the
Addendums were illegal would redress any alleged injury to NEA, other than the Addendums
were not in a form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. School District had
every right to accept teachers' volunteered unpaid furlough days. NEA had no business
interfering with its members' voluntary actions that benefited School District. The district court
wrongfully determined that NEA had an interest to see that School District comply with Idaho
Code§ 33-513. (R., p. 108.)
The district court cannot create a harm by judicial fiat. The court's inference that there
was harm to NEA is not supported by the Record. NEA had no standing to seek any redress from
the district court.
This Court should reverse the findings and conclusions of the trial court and order
summary judgment for School District. Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,

Inc., et al., 141 Idaho 754, 118 P.3d 86 (2005).

D.

The Completely Performed Addendums Rendered the Issue Presented by NEA to be
Moot.
The teachers had taken all volunteered furlough days by May 31, 2013. Oral argument

was heard August 1, 2013, 60 days after all furlough days had been completed. (Tr., p. 3.)
School District recognizes there is no absolute test to determine mootness. "Basically, the
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is
a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
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and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,
108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959 (1969).
There was no real and substantial controversy in this case. The furlough days had been
completed. The Addendums had no further legal force or effect. The issue of illegality raised by
NEA was no longer live, and NEA had no "legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Freeman
v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875, 71 P.3d 471,474 (Idaho App. 2003). The issue

was moot.
"An action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted, would have
no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain
further relief based on the judgment, and no other relief is sought in the action." Wylie v. State, et
al., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011) citing Idaho Schools for Equal Educ.
Opportunity, et al. v. Idaho State Bd of Education, 128 Idaho 276, 282, 912 P.2d 644, 650

(1996). The trial court determined that by declaring the Addendums to be illegal, NEA could
prevent future use of addendums. (R., p. 110.) Even with this declaration, there was no
articulation by the trial court of any harm to NEA that makes any sense. The Addendums were
voluntary. How could NEA seek further relief for its members when there was no harm to a
member? The trial court's finding of illegality provided no relief to NEA. Freeman, supra.
School District does recognize that certain exceptions exist and certain questions must be
asked. Would the Addendums be used again (assuming a demonstrated probability of such use)
and likely evade judicial review? Did NEA suffer collateral legal consequences? Was there
substantial public interest in the use of the Addendums? Wylie, supra. School District would
suggest that the answer to these questions is, "No."
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School District was then, and is now, under a public microscope and would not dare
operate with an unbalanced budget.
NEA did not allege or present evidence that School District would ever agam use
voluntary furlough days. A theoretical possibility is not sufficient to establish "reasonable
expectation or a demonstrated probability." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,482, 102 S.Ct. 1181,
1185 (1982). A possibility that School District might accept voluntary furlough days would not
be a reasonable expectation or probability. School District did not ask for voluntary furlough
days, and there is no reason to expect that there ever would be a reason to ask for voluntary
furlough days. There is no possible way to predict that teachers would again volunteer furlough
days. There was not sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment by the trial court. Golden, supra. It would be conjectural at best to suggest that School
District would again be in the financial condition it found itself in the 2012-2013 budget year.
There was no allegation or evidence that School District would suffer a budget shortfall in any
future year. There was no showing of immediacy or reality that School District would ever again
need to accept volunteered furlough days. NEA did not allege or present evidence that it suffered
any collateral legal consequence as a result of School District's action in accepting teachers' gifts
of voluntary furlough days.
However, the district court concluded that by declaring the Addendums to be illegal,
there would be an effect, either directly or indirectly, on NEA. The district court created this
effect by inferring and concluding that NEA could use the declaration to prevent future abuses

even though there is nothing in the Record that would support that conclusion.
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There was no justiciable controversy in this case. The district court committed error in
finding that the question of illegality was not moot.

E.

The Addendums Were Not in Violation of Idaho Code§ 33-513 or§§ 33-1272 and
33-1273.
If this Court finds standing for NEA, School District then argues that the Addendums

were not in violation ofldaho Code § 33-513(1 ), and the volunteering of furlough days was not
subject to any negotiations with NEA. In finding harm to NEA, the district court has confused
the legislative purposes of§ 33-513(1) and§ 33-1272.
This discussion will first center on Idaho Code § 33-513(1) and then on Idaho Code
§§ 33-1272 and 33-1273.
1. Application ofldaho Code§ 33-513.
Idaho Code §33-513(1) provides in pertinent part as follows:
•

School district trustees "must employ professional personnel, on written contract
in form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, ... "

•

Professional personnel "at the time of entering upon the duties thereunder"
(emphasis added) must be properly certified.

•

If there is a failure "to enter into a written contract for the employment of any

such person, the state superintendent of public instruction shall withhold ensuing
apportionments until such written contract be entered into."
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•

The board of trustees is required to deliver a proposed contract for the next
ensuing year to a teacher with a time certain for the return of that employment
contract.

•

The balance of this section establishes the mechanics for delivery and return of
teachers' contracts.

The remainder of Idaho Code § 33-513 deals with other powers and duties of boards of
trustees of school districts, including but not limited to: employment of superintendents, assistant
superintendents, principals; granting voluntary leaves of absence; suspending, placing on
probation or discharging certificated professional personnel. The entirety of§ 33-513 requires
boards of trustees of school districts to be responsible for certificated employees. The only way
NEA would be included in any decision-making process regarding personnel is either by statute
or through a negotiated Master Agreement. There is no authority allowing local education
associations to be involved in any decision-making process under § 33-513 other than to be
involved in the due process requirements. There was no Master Agreement between School
District and NEA; and, therefore, NEA would not have authority to be involved in the
application or administration of§ 33-513(1 ). (R., p. 108.)
Idaho Code § 33-513 has been a part of School District's hiring of personnel since 1963,
and this Code section has been amended multiple times without any major consequence to school
districts. The statute has been applied consistently by school districts and local educational
associations to be the hiring process after a Master Agreement has been agreed upon and
negotiations have been completed under Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq. Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n v.
Bd ofTrustees of Bear Lake School Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989).
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It is well-settled law in Idaho that "the interpretation of a statute is a question of law over

which [the Supreme Court] exercise[s] free review." Keybank National Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, No.
38645, slip op. at 4 (Idaho, filed October 3, 2013), www.isc.idaho.gov/appeals-court/sccivil;
citing Carrier, et al. v. Lake Pend Oreille School District #84, et al., 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134

P.3d 655, 658 (2006). It is the function of the Supreme Court when interpreting a statute to look
first to the "clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, et al.,
154 Idaho 678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013).
The Supreme Court guidelines for statutory interpretation can be summarized as follows:
To find clearly expressed intent, the court will look at the literal language of the statute
and will interpret it in the context of all parts of the Code section. New Phase Investments, LLC
v. Jarvis, et al., 153 Idaho 207, 280 P .3d 710 (2012). If the statute in question is unambiguous,

the court gives effect to clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id. If the intent of the statute is
clear, there would be no need for the application of any other rule of construction. Gillihan v.
Gump, et al., 140 Idaho 264, 92 P .3d 514 (2004). "The plain meaning of a statute ... will prevail

unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd
results." Id. at 266. It is not the court's job to tweak a statute by "subtle refinements of the
legislation." Carrier, supra at 807. The court looks at the whole act and every word therein.
When the statute is ambiguous, the court "must examine the proffered interpretation and consider
the context in which [the] language is used, the evils to be remedied, and the objects in view."
Callies, et al. v. O'Neal, et al., 147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). Statutory language

is not ambiguous just because the parties present different interpretations. "Rather, statutory
language 'is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning."'
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Roesch, et al. v. Klemann, et al., 155 Idaho 175, 177, 307 P.3d 192, 194 (2013) citing Payette
River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,
483 (1999). If there is any ambiguity, the court looks to the "literal words of the statute, but also
the reasonableness of the proposed construction, the public policy behind the statute, and its
legislative history." Carrier, supra, at 807.
To require that voluntary agreements between individual teachers and their employer
comply with Idaho Code § 33-513(1) is well beyond the scope of the statute and would
unnecessarily restrict the ability of local school districts and boards of trustees to fulfill their
statutory responsibilities. The clear and unambiguous words of§ 33-513(1) regulate the initial
contract for employment. The statute is clear in its requirements for employing teachers and that
the initial employment contract be in a form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction. To accept the district court's reasoning in declaring the Addendums to be a violation
of § 33-513(1) and, therefore, illegal, we must ignore the long-accepted precepts of statutory
construction. Idaho Code § 33-513(1) is clear that the legislature intended to standardize
employment contracts with teachers across all school districts in Idaho. Section 33-513(1) does
not apply to voluntary agreements to contribute furlough days.
To hold otherwise, school districts in this State would be prevented from entering into
any agreement with teachers or professional employees for any other employment consideration.
School District would be unable to use addendums to superintendents' contracts defining
benefits or any other arrangement with professional staff that would in any way touch terms and
conditions of employment. Without a Master Agreement providing for the negotiation of salary
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and other terms and conditions of employment, NEA had no legal basis to interfere with the
actions taken by School District.
There was no issue before the district court dealing with the negotiation of wages or
compensation. (R., p. 108.). The district court's conclusion that any agreement affecting wage
and compensation would be injurious to NEA is not supported by the Record. It was not within
the province of NEA to enforce the provisions of§ 33-513(1). (R., p. 108.) There was no legal
basis for the Court to conclude that NEA had an interest in seeing that School District comply
with§ 33-513(1).
2. Application ofidaho Code § 33-1271, et seq.
Turning to the application of the negotiation statutes, School District does not believe it
was required to negotiate with NEA regarding the Addendums. There was no violation of Idaho
Code§§ 33-1272 and 33-1273.
Idaho Code§ 33-1271 provides in part as follows:
•

"The board of trustees of each school district ... is hereby empowered to
and shall, upon its own initiative or upon the request of a local education
organization representing a majority of the professional employees, enter
into a negotiation agreement with the local education organization . . "
LC.§ 33-1271(5).

•

"The parties to such negotiations shall negotiate in good faith on those
matters specified in any such negotiation agreement between the local
board of trustees and the local education organization." LC.§ 33-1271(1).

•

"Joint ratification of all final offers of settlement shall be made in open
meetings. Each party must provide written evidence confirming to the
other that majority ratification has occurred." LC. § 33-1271(5).

•

"Negotiations means publicly meeting and conferring in good faith for the
... purpose of reaching an agreement upon matters and conditions subject
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to negotiations as specified m a negotiation agreement between said
parties." LC. § 33-1272(3).
These Code sections should be interpreted using the same guidance provided by this
Court in the discussion above with regard to § 33-513(1). The case law, therefore, will not be
discussed again.
There was no Master Agreement between School District and NEA setting forth "matters
and conditions" that would be "subject to negotiations." Idaho Code §§ 33-1271 and 33-1272.
With no Master Agreement, School District had no obligation to negotiate the Addendums with
NEA.
Even with the district court recognizing there was no Master Agreement (R., p. 108), the
district court inferred from the Record that the superintendent had negotiated the Addendums by
allowing volunteering teachers to select the number of days to be contributed. This inference led
to the court's conclusion that individual teachers had no authority to volunteer furlough days.
The Record does not contain evidence to support that inference and conclusion. Instead of using
inferences for the benefit of School District (the party opposing the summary judgment), the
district court chose instead to use inferences to find for and support the petitioner. It is the
responsibility of the district court to use inferences for the benefit of the party opposing the
summary judgment. Black, supra.
The statute is clear and not ambiguous. It provides that school districts and local
education associations sit down to talk "for the purpose of reaching an agreement, upon matters
and conditions subject to negotiations as specified in a negotiation agreement between said
parties." Idaho Code§ 33-1272(3). School District and NEA had no such agreement.
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In adopting the legislation regarding the negotiation process between local school
districts and its teachers, the legislature further provided a specific section dealing with the intent
of the entire section. Idaho Code§ 33-1276 provides:
Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall conflict with or
abrogate the powers or duties and responsibilities vested in ... the
board of trustees of a school district by the laws of the State of
Idaho. Each school district board of trustees is entitled, without
negotiation or reference to any negotiated agreement, to take action
that may be necessary to carry out its responsibility due to
situations of emergency or acts of God.
The district court was wrong in its decision to require School District to negotiate the
Addendums with NEA. There can be no doubt that School District was in a state of emergency.
School District had every right to take the action it did and accept the teachers' contributions of
voluntary furlough days. Such action was not precluded by either a Master Agreement or statute.
The district court was incorrect in finding that individual teachers could not volunteer furlough
days without pay to help its School District. (R., p. 116.) Such a ruling results in unworkable and
undesirable outcomes.
It was not the intent of the legislature to empower teacher associations to participate in

the management of a school district. The negotiation statutes allow for negotiations

nothing

more.
The district court was wrong in finding that the Addendums were illegal as being in
violation ofldaho Code §§ 33-1272 and 33-1273.
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V. CONCLUSION
NEA lacked standing. The Addendums were not required to comply with Idaho Code§ 33513(1). The Addendums were not required to be negotiated with NEA.
The decision granting summary judgment for NEA must be reversed. The district court
should be instructed to enter summary judgment for School District.
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